1. **What is the Santa Clara Valley Water District (Water District) doing to develop an emergency action plan for Coyote Creek?**  

The Water District is working with the City of San Jose to prepare an Emergency Action Plan for Coyote Creek. Since this plan will not be complete until after this rainy season is over, the Water District will be coordinating and communicating with the City in the near term to provide technical expertise to advise the City on hydrologic conditions. The Water District will also be coordinating field resources and equipment with the City during any potential flood events. The City has expressed a desire to have at least a 12-24 hour notice to begin planning for emergency flood conditions. To provide the City the best available information, the Water District is updating current channel capacities based on the recent flooding and available hydraulic models, will be monitoring actual creek flows, and will be forecasting creek flows based on National Weather Service forecasts. The Water District has recommended that close communication and coordination be initiated at each trigger point in addition to normal Emergency Operation Center (EOC) protocols.

Our recommendations to the City are:

a. Establish time-bound decision points for certain protective action decisions that allow enough time to execute the field operations necessary to implement the decision: for example, how much time is necessary to provide advance notification of possible evacuations to the public, and how much time is necessary to evacuate populations with English-as-a-second language and with access and functional needs.

b. Gain authorization to use communication systems such as IPAWS, Alert SCC, Reverse 911, etc.

c. Install flood evacuation routes signage.

The Water District believes that the Rock Springs neighborhood experienced flooding from Coyote Creek at a flow of between 5,600 cubic feet per second (cfs) and 6,300 cfs. Based on that information and the inherent uncertainty of an unimproved, natural creek with additional drainage area below the stream gauge, the Water District has recommended that the City adopt a warning tier system.

2. **Did the Water District provide wrong information to the city?**

The Water District believes it provided sufficient information and context to convey the flood risks for vulnerable areas along Coyote Creek. The Water District followed the procedures and protocols and provided the necessary information and data to the City for it to notify residents that flooding was imminent in the Presidents’ Day storm event.

The Water District provided the most accurate information available. The information on creek flow estimates from our hydrologists include both actual data from gauges along our waterways, and modeling estimates based on past events. Monday night, Feb. 20, as the gauges indicated the flows coming over the Anderson spillway were rising and could reach...
flood levels faster than initially expected, Water District staff adjusted the estimates as to how high the flows may get at the various downstream locations. That information was shared with the city and city staff embedded in the Water District’s EOC.

The Water District is not responsible for calling for evacuations, however a period of 24 to 48 hours is likely appropriate to facilitate a timely and orderly evacuation. It’s unclear what trigger the City of San Jose was using for its evacuation decision. If it was the flow rates from Coyote Creek, that would have only provided for a maximum of 4-6 hour notice. The Water District is working with the City of San Jose to jointly establish an emergency action plan which will provide for adequate notice in the future.

3. **How are stream gauges used?**

Existing upstream gauges are useful in providing stream flow information in advance of a “hot spot” area such as Rock Springs. It is also important to note that gauges are mechanical devices and are susceptible to damage and interference when subject to debris and impacts of high flows. Radio signals also have reliability issues during adverse weather. We continue to recommend that local jurisdictions augment Water District forecasts and gauge data with field staff observations.

4. **Did the Water District monitor conditions along the Coyote Creek corridor prior and during the storm event?**

Water District staff were at various locations along Coyote Creek. On February 16, 17 and 20 staff performed inspections of downstream levees, and monitored other various locations between the dam and the bay. On Feb 20 and 21, Flood Inspection Teams continued to inspect locations at the Madrone gauge, Rock Springs, E. William Street, Berryessa Road, South Bay Mobile Home Park and Charcot, Montague Expressway, and Highway 237. Staff advised police officers at the South Bay Mobile Home Park on Feb 21 that peak flow was likely to overtop the levee whereupon officers announced mandatory evacuations. The Water District’s EOC was advised by Water District staff of the pending overtopping and staff proceeded to install measures to protect the levee.

Water District hydrographers obtained real time flow measurements to calibrate stream gauges at Madrone, Edenvale, and E. William and communicate to EOC staff.

On Feb 20 and 21, the District’s Flood Information Teams were at Coyote creek to monitor flow conditions and communicate to EOC staff about flood risk of the creek.

On Feb 21 and 22, Water District staff responded to a break in the Coyote Canal and communicated that activity through the EOC. Staff also responded to a City request through the EOC to clear debris from Metcalf Road on Feb 20 and 21.
5. **Are there technological improvements that can be implemented with the Water District's sensors at key locations (e.g., Edenvale, William Street) that will provide a clearer indication of flood risk?**

While technology such as telemetry sensors is a useful tool for obtaining some field information, nighttime visibility and reliability limits its potential. Storm monitoring should rely on multiple lines of information including field reports.

6. **Could the Water District have prevented the flooding?**

No. Weather events overtook the Coyote Creek’s current capacity to safely move water downstream to the San Francisco Bay.

Channel obstructions and vegetative growth can contribute to increases in water level of a stream. The degree to which obstructions may have contributed to the flooding is difficult to determine after the fact because obstructions and vegetation may have been cleared out as the floodwaters moved through.

The upstream area of Coyote Creek that recently flooded is not an improved flood protection channel. It is a natural, unimproved creek that has not been analyzed, designed, permitted, and constructed to convey a specific flood event. Sediment accumulation and vegetative growth are variables that can impact flow conveyance as such the creek cannot be “maintained.” The Water District has communicated with the city and adjacent Coyote Creek property owners about flood risk.

The Water District maintains property where it has built projects and possesses land rights. Maintenance can include vegetation management, erosion control and sediment removal, which are conducted to maintain the existing capacity of a stream. The type and level of maintenance depends on a variety of factors, most significantly whether there has been a capital project that has constructed flood protection modifications to convey flood flows.

The Water District owns or has access to maintain 275 miles of the 800 miles of the creeks and rivers in Santa Clara County.

7. **Was the channel capacity data provided to the City of San Jose by the Water District accurate?**

The Water District believes that the Rock Springs neighborhood experienced flooding from Coyote Creek at a flow of between 5,600 cubic feet per second (cfs) and 6,300 cfs.

The differences between the projections and measured or calculated storm flows are not out of line with the industry standards. United States Army Corps of Engineers technical literature cites that a key hydraulic factor can vary by 25%-30% for a natural, unimproved channel like Coyote Creek, which has vegetation growth and accumulated debris that can affect
estimates. Stream flows are analyzed based on flow measurements and high water marks collected by staff.

The City was aware of the forecasts predicting flooding from the National Weather Service and from a technical and professional standpoint should have been relying on all the data presented rather than basing its actions on one single piece of data.

8. Does the Water District monitor sediment accumulation and vegetation growth in the creeks?

The Water District monitors sediment and vegetation growth for flow conveyance capacity on improved flood protection channels that have been analyzed, designed and constructed to ensure they can carry a specific flood event (i.e. 1% event). Extensive hydraulics analysis, civil engineering design, environmental work, land rights acquisition and regulatory permitting must take place prior to building an improved channel.

Coyote Creek in the areas that recently flooded is not an improved flood protection channel. It is a natural, unimproved creek that has not been analyzed, designed, permitted, and constructed to convey a specific flood event. Sediment accumulation and vegetative growth are variables that can impact flow conveyance. The Water District has communicated with the city and adjacent Coyote Creek property owners about flood risk.

9. In addition to the channel capacity estimates provided by the Water District, what other information was available leading up to the flooding?

In addition to all the information--both written and verbal provided by the Water District--the City had additional warnings and information from other agencies on which to consider and act: The National Weather Service held a webinar on Friday, Feb. 17, at 2:30 pm with the operational area, which includes invitations to the City of San Jose, the Water District and others, to collectively discuss the anticipated storm. On Sunday, Feb. 19 at 2:30 pm the National Weather Service (NWS) held a subsequent webinar and shared that the stream forecast at the Edenvale gauge was predicted to reach flood stage between Monday and Tuesday.

On Monday, Feb. 20 at 3:53 am, NWS issued a Flood Warning for Coyote Creek near Edenvale. The Flood Warning indicated that Coyote Creek at Edenvale was forecasted to rise above flood stage by Monday evening and continue to rise through the night. California Nevada River Forecast Center website showed that Coyote Creek at Edenvale would exceed the flood stage by mid-day on Monday, Feb 20, and peak at more than 7,600 cfs on Tuesday, Feb. 21 in the morning. These warnings gave the City time to inform, alert and notify residents that evacuation was necessary prior to the flooding. The City gave every indication that it was taking this action (opening shelters), but did not issue an evacuation notice.
10. What is the degree of accuracy of the hydrologic model used by the Water District?

A hydrologic model is only as accurate as the weather forecast is accurate. Rainfall is one of the primary factors affecting the prediction of flow amount and timing from a storm. The Water District typically updates its stream forecast when the National Weather Service updates its weather forecast.

11. How has the Water District utilized funds from the 2012 voter approved Measure B to support creek maintenance and flood safety measures along Coyote Creek?

A. Creek Maintenance

Priority E1 of the Safe Clean Water Program supports the Water District’s ongoing sediment removal and vegetation management activities that reduce flood risk by maintaining design conveyance capacity of flood protection projects. There are 800 miles of creeks and streams in Santa Clara County and the Water District only has access or owns 275 miles. The remaining stretches of creeks are owned by Santa Clara County, private entities, cities in which the creeks are located, and other public agencies.

B. Coyote Creek Flood Protection Project Planning

The Water District study provided valuable understanding of the flooding problem and potential solutions. However, the study also concluded that the cost of a project far exceeded the funds allocated from Measure B. The Water District even pursued federal funding for a project, but was unable to gain traction for that funding from the federal government. Without additional funding, only a limited project could be developed that would provide minimal flood protection benefits to the community.

C. Automated flood forecast and warning system

The Water District has been working on the Coyote Creek flood warning system and has completed both hydrologic and some hydraulic models. It is one of the most difficult forecast points because of dual reservoir influence (both Coyote Reservoir and Anderson Reservoir feed into it) and the abundance of tributaries throughout the creek length. With the work in its current state, we can develop forecasts of the Anderson spillway during this year’s storm events.

Expenditure of funds is overseen by an independent monitoring committee and status reports are provided on the Water District’s web site. The program does not identify making funds available to individual property owners or cities for vegetation control or sediment removal.

12. Why hasn’t there been a project on Coyote Creek since the floods in 1997?

After the Rock Springs neighborhood was flooded in 1997, the Water District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted a study, beginning in 2000, of the proposed project area to determine whether the Water District and Corps could partner for the design and construction
of a flood protection project. On February 2002, the Corps notified the Water District that the preliminary analysis from the feasibility study did not meet the minimum requirements to be of federal interest. The project was not further developed due to lack of federal funding.

The Water District allocated approximately $32M to a Coyote Creek Flood Protection Project in the voter-approved Clean, Safe Creeks Program (2000) and subsequently the Safe, Clean Water Program (2012).

Funding from those programs was used for project planning, which identified a need for $500 million to $1 billion. The project was placed on hold in Fiscal Year 2016 due to the need for additional funding sources.

13. What is the Water District doing now?

The Water District is asking for federal assistance to address, reduce and prevent future flooding of vulnerable areas along Coyote Creek.

With the funds allocated to a Coyote Creek project in Safe, Clean Water, staff will propose options to the board of directors in efforts to provide some degree of flood protection to the impacted areas along Coyote Creek while pursuing a federal project with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The Water District is actively working with the City of San Jose to develop a thorough joint emergency action plan and to ensure improved emergency communications. We expect to have the plan in place prior to the next rainy season.

14. Is the Water District considering options for a temporary floodwall between Needles Drive and Bevin Brook?

The Water District is currently evaluating potential options to provide limited flood protection in the Rock Springs area. However, we must ensure that any proposed concepts do not shift or exacerbate the flood risk elsewhere that could impact other neighborhoods. Flood protection projects should be completed downstream first. Completing projects along upstream stretches of the creek can increase flows downstream and induce flooding in other areas.

15. What is the Anderson Dam Seismic Retrofit project?

Anderson Reservoir is the largest of the 10 Water District reservoirs and provides a reliable supply of water to Santa Clara County. It has a total storage capacity of 89,073 acre-feet (one acre-foot is 325,851 gallons of water, enough to serve two households of five for one year). The Water District initiated the Anderson Dam Seismic Retrofit Project in 2012 as a permanent fix to the risks identified by a seismic study. In addition to seismically retrofitting the dam embankment, the planning phase of the project identified the need to:
• Replace the existing outlet pipe that runs below the dam to improve capacity and reliability
• Increase the wall height of the concrete spillway to approximately 9 ft and the height of the dam crest to 7 ft to provide more freeboard required to pass the revised Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)

A storage restriction of about 55 feet below the dam crest or about 25 feet below the spillway height has been put in place to protect the public, reducing the allowed storage capacity to 61,810 acre-feet. The Water District and regulatory agencies believe that this restriction will prevent the uncontrolled release of water in case the dam is structurally damaged after a major earthquake. This project is currently in the design phase.

16. Did the Water District release too much water from Anderson Reservoir to cause the flooding?

No, the water that flowed into Coyote Creek from Anderson reservoir was entirely due to the amount of rainfall and watershed runoff.

The Water District began releasing water from Anderson Reservoir through the outlet at the base of the dam on Jan. 9, after the first atmospheric river of the season hit our region. At that time the county’s largest reservoir was less than half full at 48%.

The outlet stayed open almost continuously as the subsequent storms dropped unprecedented amounts of rain in the watershed until the reservoir level reached the spillway on Feb.18. At that point the outlet was closed and the excess water flowing into the reservoir continued over the spillway and into Coyote Creek. There is no way to control that flow spilling from the reservoir.

17. What does the Water District do when the water level exceeds the reservoir’s restriction? Isn’t it at a higher risk of failure?

Since Anderson Dam was built in 1950, the reservoir has reached its capacity 11 times, including this past February. The regulatory agencies that work with the Water District to set the storage restriction understand that the reservoir water surface elevation cannot always be maintained at or below a restricted level. For example, they understand that storms produce rainfall runoff into reservoirs that will temporarily increase the amount of water stored, such as what occurred in early 2017. The Water District makes every effort to restore the reservoir to its restricted level to stay in compliance with the regulatory requirements. Efforts include fully opening the outlet and exploring pump over systems to increase discharge rate.

When the reservoir exceeds the restricted level the dam is at greater risk of seismic deformations during a large seismic event. While earthquakes cannot be predicted with any precision, the chance of a large earthquake occurring and the epicenter being located at the nearest point to the dam during the limited time the reservoir is above the restricted level is extremely remote. Keep in mind that since its construction in 1950, this dam has performed well.
in numerous earthquakes, including the 1984 Morgan Hill Earthquake and the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake.

18. What are the risks of dam failure before construction?

The Water District has limited the amount of water that can be stored in the reservoir to reduce the likelihood of water overtopping the dam should damage occur during a large earthquake prior to construction of the retrofit project.

The dam’s two regulatory agencies, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the California Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) have approved the restriction as a temporary and reasonable solution to protect the public.

19. Will the spillway improvements increase the risk of flooding for downstream properties?

The spillway modifications will not increase the amount of water that will spill. Instead, it will increase the volume of storm runoff that can be safely passed without overtopping the dam. Because Anderson Reservoir absorbs and stores runoff from the surrounding watershed, it provides a measure of flood protection to downstream property owners even when full, despite the fact that it was not constructed as a flood protection project.

The following are responses to some of the questions asked at the April 6th community meeting and workshop.

20. Why didn’t people know there will be flooding when dam is full?

The Water District believes it provided sufficient information and context to convey the flood risks for vulnerable areas along Coyote Creek. The Water District followed the procedures and protocols and provided the necessary information and data to the City of San Jose for it to notify residents that flooding was imminent in the Presidents’ Day storm event.

The Water District provided the most accurate information available. The information on creek flow estimates from our hydrologists include both actual data from gauges along our waterways, and modeling estimates based on past events. Monday night, Feb. 20, as the gauges indicated the flows coming over the Anderson spillway were rising and could reach flood levels faster than initially expected, District staff adjusted the flow estimates at the various downstream locations. That information was shared with the City and city staff embedded in the Water District’s Emergency Operation Center (EOC).
21. **Heavy rain was forecasted 10 days before. Why not consider pumps to decrease water levels in preparation at Anderson and Coyote Reservoir?**

Since before the flooding, The Water District has been evaluating the possibility of pumping water out of the reservoir to lower it to the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) restricted level. The Water District has not considered pump-over for flood management. The preliminary pumping scheme is currently being reviewed by DSOD and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). If required, The Water District may implement the pumps once DSOD and FERC approves the pump-over design and necessary environmental permits have been obtained.

22. **Reference to question 18 on the FAQ – No assurance the dam will never exceed 68%. Doesn’t feel safe as a standard.**

Anderson Reservoir has operated well for the last 67 years and through several major earthquakes. It wasn’t until 2011, that Anderson Reservoir was restricted to 68% of its capacity. This restriction is an interim risk reduction measure, while the retrofit project is constructed, to prevent the uncontrolled release of reservoir water in case the dam slumped and cracked during a large earthquake near the dam. The restriction has been imposed with the understanding that it could be exceeded during very wet winters and the reservoir could remain above the restricted level for unpredictable time periods. The seismic analyses and recommended restrictions are based on extremely conservative assumptions of a Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) and that such an event would occur at the closest proximity to the dam. The probability of a large earthquake occurring near the dam during these time periods and the risk associated with it are relatively low. This restriction was reviewed and approved by DSOD and FERC. The Water District is currently re-evaluating the restriction based on the new findings discovered during the development of Anderson Dam Seismic Retrofit Project.

23. **67 years of Anderson dam not being fixed, why?**

Seismic behavior of dams was not well understood in 1950s, when Anderson Dam was constructed. The Water District undertook the seismic evaluation of Anderson Dam in 2009 with the goal of verifying the performance of the dam during a large earthquake, based on the latest seismic standards. The evaluation was approved by the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Water District initiated the Anderson Dam Seismic Retrofit Project in 2011 once it was concluded by the seismic evaluation that the dam foundation could liquefy and lose strength during a large earthquake occurring near the dam.
24. Why not keep reservoirs lower than mandated?

The Water District manages the Anderson and Coyote reservoirs in accordance with existing operating procedures and requirements based on known and forecast information available at the time.

The Water District has been evaluating the possibility of pumping water out of the reservoir to lower it to the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) restricted level. The Water District has not considered pump-over for flood management. The preliminary pumping scheme is currently being reviewed by DSOD and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). If required, The Water District may implement the pumps once DSOD and FERC approves the pump-over design and necessary environmental permits have been obtained.

25. If the water district knew about the flooding, why wasn’t the EOC open? (Feb. 19-20)

The Water District had staff in the Water District’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during the weekend on both Saturday and Sunday leading up to the storm to monitor weather conditions. Additionally, District staff were in the field assessing conditions and supplying the sand bag locations. Staff was monitoring weather forecasts, held a Water District storm assessment team conference call and also participated in inter-agency conference calls to convey estimated flow rates projected to come over the spillway from Anderson Reservoir as well as other locations countywide. District staff also participated in the National Weather Service’s webinar on the storm forecast on Sunday, February 19, 2017. From these calls, it was decided to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 8 am on Monday Feb. 20. The EOC remained open until the evening of Wednesday February 22.

26. Why were animals moved from the zoo ahead of time, but not people?

Happy Hollow Park and Zoo is owned and operated by the City of San Jose. The decision to evacuate animals was made by city staff. This question must be referred to the city for a response.

27. When and where is the creek being cleared?

The Water District removed sediment and vegetation on Coyote Creek last summer in improved sections. We are currently evaluating our options to remove invasive plants at some additional locations this summer.

28. Are there unimproved sections of Coyote Creek?

Most of Coyote Creek upstream(south) of Montague Expressway is unimproved.
29. Why are the capacity projections off by a surprising amount?

Much like weather predictions, creek capacity estimates for a natural creek are variable. Creek capacity estimates also can change over time. Coyote Creek capacity estimates are based on best available historic data and are within industry range.

30. Why was Guadalupe Creek successful and Coyote Creek not?

The Lower Guadalupe River Project and Downtown Guadalupe River Project from the Marina County Park in Alviso to Interstate 280 were completed in 2004. The Lower Guadalupe River Flood Protection Project was completed with local funds and the Downtown Guadalupe River Flood Protection Project was a joint project with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Lower Coyote Creek Flood Protection Project, from South San Francisco Bay to Montague Expressway, was another joint project with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed in 1995.

Due to limited federal funding and the competitive nature of the benefit-to-cost ratio for federal participation, the mid-Coyote Creek Project has not received federal funding to proceed with a flood risk reduction study upstream of Montague Expressway. With the recent flooding along Coyote Creek from the Presidents’ Day storm, The Water District sent a letter to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers requesting federal funding to proceed with the flood risk reduction study for Coyote Creek upstream of Montague Expressway.

The Water District is focusing on the following flood protection projects based on the flood damage benefits in the Coyote Watershed: design and construction of the Lower Penitencia Creek Project, design and construction of the Lower Berryessa Creek Project, design and construction of the Upper Berryessa Creek Project, design and construction of the Lower Silver Creek Project, design and construction of the Cunningham Detention Certification Project, and planning and partial construction of the Coyote Creek Project (from Montague Expressway to Interstate 280). Additional funding sources are needed to complete flood protection work along Coyote Creek.

31. When is the water district going to clean Coyote Creek to prevent future flooding?

The Water District has ongoing programs that remove trash and debris from District property along Coyote Creek through its good neighbor, homeless encampment clean ups and Adopt A Creek programs. The Water District removes invasive vegetation species and will be undertaking that activity at some locations along Coyote Creek this summer. This work alone will not prevent future flooding because Coyote Creek has not been improved to convey flood flows.
32. **Is the water district considering installing a floodwall along the creek?**

The Water District is currently evaluating potential options to provide limited flood protection in the Rock Springs area. However, we must ensure that any proposed concepts do not shift or exacerbate the flood risk elsewhere that could impact other neighborhoods. Flood protection projects should be completed downstream first. Completing projects along upstream stretches of the creek can increase flows downstream and induce flooding in other areas.

33. **Communication about this meeting was not sufficient.**

The Water District notified residents about these meetings via postal mail, electronically, and through other public agencies. Our initial outreach included mailers to all homes in impacted areas, a countywide posting on the Nextdoor social media website, and by electronic notification from city council offices and a school district in impacted areas.

The Franklin McKinley School District is helping the Water District coordinate and notify impacted families through use of their community liaison. We also coordinated flyer distributions with the mobile home park managers at the Golden Wheel Park and the South Bay Mobile Home Park. Lastly, a press advisory was issued resulting in various news stories announcing the meetings on air.

Mailed notices were sent out in English, Spanish, Vietnamese.

34. **Is the Division of Safety and Dams investigating the flooding events?**

The Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) regulates safety aspects related to dams. Anderson Reservoir is operated by The Water District as a water supply facility. The DSOD does not have jurisdiction on Coyote Creek and is not investigating the flooding event.

35. **How was the recent bond money spent (Safe, Clean Water and Natural Flood Protection)?**

In November 2012, the voters of Santa Clara County overwhelmingly supported Measure B, the Safe, Clean Water and Natural Flood Protection Program. The Independent Monitoring Committee annually reviews the implementation of the intended results of the program and reports its findings to the Santa Clara Valley Water District Board of Directors, which makes the Committee report available to the residents and voters of Santa Clara County. The Fiscal year 2015/2016 report along with financial information is available online at [www.valleywater.org/SafeCleanWater.aspx](http://www.valleywater.org/SafeCleanWater.aspx).

36. **Sandbag locations were closed, why?**

Water District staff attempted to deliver sandbags to the city corporation yard, but the facility was closed and locked. This occurred on Monday, February 20, 2017 at 8:53am and the site was unstaffed due to the holiday. The Water District contacted the City of San Jose Park Service and was finally able to gain access to Kelly Park, an alternative pick up site, by 11:15
am. It should be noted that this site is yards from the Rock Springs area and under 2 miles from the William Street area.

Sandbags are delivered to a variety of locations; there are 7 filled sandbag sites throughout Santa Clara County, 4 of which are located on City of San Jose owned yards. The Sandbag sites are generally located in areas that are not subject to flooding to allow access during an event. The sites are identified on the Water District’s web site so that the community can be informed of their availability.

37. Hotspots map: Where was lower Silver Creek on the map of hotspots? Silver Creek floods as well.

Several historic hotspots on Lower Silver Creek have been eliminated due to construction of the Lower Silver Creek Flood Protection Project improvements, currently in final phases of completion.

38. What is the Santa Clara District Fee Area?

This refers to property owned by the Water District. The Water District owns property and holds easements at various locations throughout the county.

39. Saw City deliver sandbags to residents, but where was the Water District or County?

The Water District provides sand and sandbags to 7 locations throughout the county. These deliveries are made by a contractor. District staff along with San Jose Conservation Corps crews were filling sandbags as quickly as possible to ensure availability of bags.

40. Evacuation orders happened after water was receding.

The Water District is not responsible for calling evacuations. Local municipalities are charged with calling evacuations as they direct their respective emergency response departments (police and fire).

41. Why is Santa Clara Valley Water District not giving information clearly, properly to the City of San Jose about flood on Feb. 22?

The Water District believes it provided sufficient information and context to convey the flood risks for vulnerable areas along Coyote Creek. The Water District followed the procedures and protocols and provided the necessary information and data to the city for it to notify residents that flooding was imminent in the Presidents’ Day storm event.

The Water District provided the most accurate information available. The information on creek flow estimates from our hydrologists include both actual data from gauges along our waterways, and modeling estimates based on past events. Monday night, Feb. 20, as the gauges indicated the flows coming over the Anderson spillway were rising and could reach
flood levels faster than initially expected, District staff adjusted the estimates as to how high the flows may get at the various downstream locations. That information was shared with the city and city staff embedded in the Water District’s Emergency Operations Center.

The Water District is not responsible for calling for evacuations, however a period of 24 to 48 hours is likely appropriate to facilitate a timely and orderly evacuation. It’s unclear what trigger the City of San Jose was using for its evacuation decision. If it was the flow rates from Coyote Creek that only would have provided for a maximum of 4-6 hours of notice.
The Water District is working with the City of San Jose to jointly establish an emergency action plan which will provide for adequate notice in the future.

For additional information or to sign up to receive updates on the Anderson Dam Seismic Retrofit Project, please go to: www.valleywater.org/Services/AndersonDamAndReservoir.aspx